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FROM SEA TO SHINING SEA: A NEW APPROACH TO
INTERPRETING THE FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST
IMPROVEMENTS ACT
ABSTRACT
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) was passed in
1982 to govern the application of the Sherman Act to antitrust violations that
occurred abroad. While the statute received little attention in its early years,
public and private plaintiffs have recently begun to collect large fines and
penalties under its jurisdiction. As the number of parties subject to these
judgments has continued to grow, the increasing focus on the FTAIA has
caused uneven development of the statute: while certain aspects of the FTAIA
were defined and refined by judicial interpretation, other language in the
statute remained underdeveloped.
This Comment focuses on the requirement within the FTAIA that conduct
from a foreign entity must have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” on United States commerce. This section of the FTAIA
forms the basis of the statute. That is, to satisfy the FTAIA the effect of the
defendant’s conduct must have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” on American commerce and that effect must “give[] rise to
a claim” under the Sherman Act. The “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” requirement is greatly underdeveloped: some courts have
interpreted certain words in the phrase, while others have provided no
guidance as to the standard by which the effect requirement is judged.
This Comment proposes a new interpretation of the “direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect” requirement of the FTAIA. This new
interpretation provides courts with the means to interpret a section of the
FTAIA by balancing previous judicial attempts at deciphering the statute with
the intent of the members of Congress who drafted it. By considering whether
the anticompetitive conduct proximately causes the harmful effect on U.S.
commerce, creates a substantial effect on the price and volume of the good,
and the effect is reasonably foreseeable to an ordinary businessperson in the
foreign entity’s market, this Comment’s interpretation will give businesses,
practitioners, and judges a lens that will help clarify the FTAIA. This unified
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approach to interpreting the FTAIA also provides an efficient remedy to the
confusion created by contradicting interpretations of the statute.
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INTRODUCTION
Enforcement of the Sherman Act against international cartels and antitrust
violations beyond the borders of the United States has become big business for
both private litigants and the government. The recent success of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) demonstrates how lucrative prosecuting these
overseas violations can be. The DOJ recently obtained a settlement in which
nine Japan-based companies and two executives paid more than $740 million
in criminal fines for their involvement in conspiracies to fix the prices of auto
parts.1 The DOJ collected over $1.1 billion dollars in criminal antitrust fines in
the 2013 fiscal year,2 tying its record for highest total antitrust fines collected
in a fiscal year.3 These massive figures draw attention away from an interesting
anomaly within antitrust-law enforcement. While impressive fines continue to
mount against foreign entities, certain aspects of the law that governs these
claims, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), have not been
extensively interpreted by U.S. courts.
The FTAIA allows U.S. courts to hold foreign companies liable for
violations of the Sherman Act. The FTAIA only applies to conduct involving
export trade or export commerce.4 For a court to allow for Sherman Act
liability under the FTAIA, the conduct must satisfy two conditions. First, the
conduct must have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on
U.S. commerce.5 Second, the effect must “give[] rise to a claim” brought by

1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nine Automobile Parts Manufacturers and Two Executives Agree
to Plead Guilty to Fixing Prices on Automobile Parts Sold to U.S. Car Manufacturers and Installed in U.S.
Cars (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/300969.pdf.
2 Antitrust Div., Criminal Enforcement, Fine and Jail Charts Through Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. DEP’T
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/264101.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
3 The total fines collected in fiscal year 2013 tied the total fines collected in fiscal year 2012. Id.
FY2012 also saw the DOJ tie its largest judgment ever in a court proceeding when it was awarded a
$500 million dollar judgment against AU Optronics. Antitrust Div., Sherman Act Violations Yielding a
Corporate Fine of $10 Million or More, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
criminal/sherman10.pdf (last updated Feb. 4, 2015).
4 Any conduct involving “import trade or import commerce” bypasses FTAIA analysis and is only
evaluated under the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012). This is commonly referred to as the “import
exception.” See, e.g., Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 471 n.11 (3d Cir.
2011).
5 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1). The language of the FTAIA provides a more convoluted definition of what
commerce falls within the definition of the statue. Courts, however, have recognized that the FTAIA applies to
all non-import, nondomestic commerce. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 854 (7th Cir.
2012) (en banc). This Comment refers to this non-import, nondomestic commerce as either “commerce” or
“U.S. commerce” for simplicity purposes.
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the plaintiff under the Sherman Act.6 Courts that have discussed the FTAIA
often focus on how these requirements apply to civil procedure7 or on the
“gives rise to a claim” prong.8 In contrast, little to no discussion has occurred
regarding the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect”
requirement of the FTAIA. The underdevelopment of the “direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect” requirement of the FTAIA has caused
confusion in the lower courts.
A comparison of hypothetical scenarios illuminates this confusion.9 First,
imagine that a group of international companies that produce a computer
component, decide to collude and charge a higher price for the component.10
The cartel sells the price-fixed component to different companies that assemble
the computer outside of the United States.11 These assembled computers,
which contain the price-fixed component, are then sold to consumers
throughout the world.12 Second, imagine a similar group of international
companies that produce a component of televisions.13 These international
companies engage in conduct similar to that in the previous example: they
collude and charge a higher price and then sell to different companies that
assemble the televisions outside of the United States.14 Again, the assembled
6

15 U.S.C. § 6a(2).
A circuit split had emerged concerning whether the FTAIA limited the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court or created a substantive element of an antitrust claim. Compare, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechs.,
379 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the FTAIA limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the court),
with Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 408 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that the FTAIA sets
out a substantive element of an antitrust claim), Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852 (same), and Animal Sci. Prods.,
654 F.3d at 466 (same). Whether the FTAIA affects subject matter jurisdiction or a substantive element of the
claim creates different pleading requirements for a motion to dismiss. See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & Kory
Wilmont, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Did Arbaugh Erase Decades of Consensus
Building? 12 ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2013, art. no. 3, at 1, 1–2. However, the Ninth Circuit recently
reversed its position, thereby eliminating the circuit split. See United States v. Hui Hsiung, —F.3d—, 2015
WL 400550 (9th Cir. 2014).
8 On remand from the Supreme Court, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the effect must be the
proximate cause of the harm suffered by the plaintiff in order to “give[] rise to a claim” under the FTAIA.
Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005), enforcing 542 U.S.
155 (2004). Contra In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 987 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding that “but for” causation meets the requirements of the FTAIA).
9 These hypothetical scenarios are based on the facts from In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust
Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 2d 555 (D. Del. 2006) and In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation,
822 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
10 See Intel, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
11 See id. at 560.
12 See id.
13 See TFT-LCD, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
14 See id.
7
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televisions are sold to consumers throughout the world.15 Thus, these two
hypothetical scenarios contain identical facts, with the only difference being
the actual product involved in the anticompetitive conduct.
These hypothetical scenarios are based on actual cases. The courts in these
cases reached different conclusions regarding antitrust liability. The computer
hypothetical is modeled on the facts of In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor
Antitrust Litigation, a case in which the plaintiff argued that foreign
price-fixing by the defendant resulted in reduced revenue and hurt the
plaintiff’s ability to compete in the United States.16 The court held that the
chain of events that eventually resulted in the alleged reduction in competition
in the United States was not sufficiently “direct.”17 In contrast, the television
hypothetical is modeled on the facts of In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust
Litigation, a case in which the plaintiff claimed that inflated prices created by
the defendant’s foreign conduct were passed on to U.S. consumers.18 The court
in TFT-LCD held that the foreign companies were subject to antitrust liability
based on the “direct” effect their actions had in the United States.19 While the
actual cases contain more nuances than the brief hypothetical scenarios above,
the issue remains the same: similar situations have received different treatment
from judges interpreting the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect” prong of the FTAIA.
The “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” prong of the
FTAIA forms the basis of the statute. This prong defines the effect on U.S.
commerce that must be shown to have a claim under the statute, which in turn
is analyzed in the second prong of the FTAIA to determine whether that effect
on U.S. commerce “gives rise to” the plaintiff’s claim.20 Judicial interpretation
of the FTAIA focuses almost exclusively on this “gives rise to” prong of the
FTAIA.21 Proceeding to the “gives rise to” analysis without clearly defining

15

See id.
452 F. Supp. 2d at 560–61.
17 Id.
18 822 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
19 Id. at 966. Interestingly, the court did not find that the behavior complained of fell into the import
exemption of the FTAIA even though the evidence presented in the opinion implies that some number of LCD
panels ended up in the United States. See id. at 955 (explaining that alleged conduct caused “end-users to pay
inflated prices in the United States for electronic items that contained LCD panels”).
20 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
21 See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 389–90 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing decision by the
lower court based on improper analysis of whether the effect gave rise to plaintiff’s claim), abrogated by
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (stating that independent harm to foreign
16
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the effect as required under the first prong of the FTAIA essentially ignores a
key assumption for the second prong: there was a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. commerce as required by the FTAIA.22
By including this language, Congress sought to demonstrate that not all effects
on U.S. commerce would be illegal under the FTAIA.23 If courts do not take
the time to develop a clear standard for the effect requirement and apply it to
each case, their decisions could lead to false positives under the FTAIA.
Specifically, the courts could improperly find liability for effects on U.S.
commerce that are not “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” but still
give rise to a claim under the FTAIA. Thus, the FTAIA would function
improperly by over-expanding the range of effects on U.S. commerce that fall
under the statute.
In addition, the different interpretations of the “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” requirement present interpretation problems for
judges, practitioners, and foreign companies. Judges have started to rely on
different standards to define “direct,” “substantial,” and “reasonably
foreseeable.”24 These differing standards may overwhelm practitioners when
preparing their arguments and assessing their clients’ potential liability.
Because of the myriad of ways the effect requirement is interpreted, an
attorney risks losing the case by not addressing all of the interpretations of
these terms. The lack of clarity created by the different interpretations of the
FTAIA also forces companies to second-guess their involvement in certain
behavior that may be legal abroad but potentially illegal in the United States.

consumers cannot form the basis of FTAIA claim), as recognized in JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387
F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2004).
22 See, e.g., In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ.00MDL1328(PAM), 2005 WL
1080790 at *4–5 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005) (demonstrating where a court assumes a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” without discussion in order to address whether that effect “gives rise to” the
alleged injury), aff’d, 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007).
23 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9–10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2494–95 (“[T]here
should be no American antitrust jurisdiction absent a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on
domestic commerce or a domestic competitor.”). This language mirrors the over-breadth concern that the
Supreme Court has discussed for over a century in the context of the applicability of the U.S. antitrust laws.
See, e.g., Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169 (“[T]he FTAIA’s language and history suggest that Congress designed
the FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as
applied to foreign commerce.”); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355, 357 (1909) (stating
that “[i]t is surprising to hear it argued that [acts outside of the United States] were governed by the [Sherman
Act]” and that the broad language of the Sherman Act applied to “every one subject to such legislation, not all
that the legislator subsequently may be able to catch”).
24 See infra Part II.A.1, B.1, C.1.
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To remedy the confusion over how to interpret the requirement of a “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. commerce within the
FTAIA, this Comment proposes definitions for each word in this prong of the
statute. First, conduct is “direct” if it proximately causes the effect in the
United States. Second, conduct is “substantial” if the alleged anticompetitive
conduct’s effect on the price and volume of the good in the United States is in
turn “substantial.” Third, conduct is “reasonably foreseeable” if an objective
businessperson could foresee the conduct affecting the United States. This
Comment proposes that courts should unite around this unified definition of
what a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” is under the
FTAIA. This will provide a clear, consistent, and efficient standard for
assessing what effect anticompetitive conduct must have on U.S. commerce to
fall within the purview of the U.S. antitrust laws.
The definitions proposed in this Comment are grounded in existing case
law.25 Indeed, some courts have used parts of the proposed definitions in their
analysis of the FTAIA,26 and one court has seemingly used all three.27
However, no court has adopted all three definitions together on a consistent
basis in interpreting the FTAIA. This Comment will focus on why these
definitions most accurately embody the purpose of the FTAIA28 and how their
consistent adoption can create a more efficient mechanism for enforcing the
FTAIA.29
Part I of this Comment will provide background on the development of the
effects requirement as first created by the courts and then codified in the
FTAIA using the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” language.
Part I will also demonstrate the confusion created by Supreme Court and lower
court decisions concerning the effects language within the FTAIA. Part II will
develop the new, unified standard proposed by this Comment for interpreting
the FTAIA by analyzing each individual phrase within the “direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable” language of the statute. Within Part II, this
Comment will highlight different approaches taken by the courts in
interpreting the phrase, present the most appropriate definition given these
judicial interpretations, and provide a test case for how each element of the

25
26
27
28
29

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.1, B.1, C.1.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.A.2, B.2, C.2.
See infra Part III.
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new, unified standard should be interpreted in practice. Part III will discuss the
implications of the new standard for interpreting the FTAIA.
I. THE EFFECTS REQUIREMENT AND FOREIGN ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS: AN
ELUSIVE STANDARD
While the phrase “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” was
created by the drafters of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,
requiring a certain effect on U.S. commerce to raise an antitrust claim in the
United States based on foreign conduct was not a novel concept to courts.30
The legislative history of the FTAIA31 demonstrates that the statutory phrasing
was a modification of the “effects” test first created by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).32 Although the “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” language was meant to be a “simple
and straightforward clarification of existing American law,”33 a lack of
guidance by Congress and subsequent treatment by the Supreme Court and
lower courts have created uncertainty as to the correct standard required under
the FTAIA.
This Part focuses on the effects requirement, which public and private
parties must meet before holding an international entity liable under
U.S. antitrust law since the passage of the Sherman Act. This Part outlines the
three phases of development of the effects requirement, which culminated in
the modern understanding of the “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” requirement under the FTAIA. The first section of this Part
discusses the creation of the “effects” test in Alcoa and the difficulties of
applying the Alcoa standard in subsequent decisions. The second section lays
out the text of the FTAIA, with the relevant legislative history to understand
the considerations of the legislators who passed the law. This section also
generally demonstrates how the statute is meant to function according to the
Supreme Court. The third section provides a sampling of cases interpreting the
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” requirement under the

30 This requirement was first discussed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d
416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945).
31 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490 (“Since Judge Learned
Hand’s opinion in [Alcoa], it has been relatively clear that it is the situs of the effects . . . that determines
whether United States antitrust law applies. There remains, however, some disparity . . . regarding the quantum
and nature of the effects required to create jurisdiction.”).
32 148 F.2d at 416.
33 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2.
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FTAIA. This section discusses the lack of guidance provided by the only two
Supreme Court cases that have interpreted the FTAIA and lays out two
examples of current interpretations of the FTAIA effect requirement to
highlight the difficulty courts have interpreting the statute.
A. The “Effects” Test Under Alcoa
Beginning at the turn of the century, U.S. courts wrestled with the issue of
when to apply American antitrust laws to foreign activities and foreign
entities.34 Inconsistency in the original standard used to apply the antitrust laws
to foreign entities centered on whether and to what degree considerations of
international comity should be weighed when determining liability.35 Much of
this inconsistency was driven by the Supreme Court. After denying liability on
the basis of international comity in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co.,36 the Court found two British entities liable in United States v. American
Tobacco Co. without any discussion of international comity.37 Judge Learned
Hand’s opinion in Alcoa jettisoned these comity considerations.38 In their
place, he created the initial “effects” test that would serve as the basis for
adopting the FTAIA nearly four decades later.
Acting as the court of last resort,39 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Alcoa famously found that the largest40 domestic producer of
aluminum violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the market
for virgin aluminum ingot.41 Judge Hand also discussed applying the U.S.
antitrust laws to Aluminum Limited, an entity incorporated in Canada to take
34 Compare Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (declining to extend the Sherman
Act to foreign conduct), with United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (Sherman Act extended
to British companies), and United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (Sherman Act extended to
Mexican company).
35 The Court in American Banana denied application of the Sherman Act on the basis of international
comity but provided no guidance on how to weigh comity considerations in other decisions. Am. Banana, 213
U.S. at 355–57.
36 See id. at 356 (“For another jurisdiction . . . to treat [a foreign entity] according to its own
notions . . . would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations . . . .”).
37 See Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 181–84.
38 Judge Hand made no reference to comity in the entirety of his opinion. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
39 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit became the court of last resort after four members of the
Supreme Court disqualified themselves from hearing the case. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 253 n.14 (5th ed. 2009).
40 For all essential purposes, Alcoa was the only domestic producer of aluminum at that time.
41 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 432.
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over the properties of Alcoa outside of the United States.42 This foreign
corporation was owned by the same individuals who owned Alcoa43 and had
entered into two separate agreements with corporations from France, Germany,
Switzerland, and Great Britain.44
Judge Hand acknowledged that the two agreements, which limited the
amount of aluminum available,45 were clearly violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.46 The issue, however, was whether the Act should apply to
foreign entities.47 Judge Hand highlighted two scenarios that demonstrated his
hesitancy to apply the Sherman Act to foreign entities. First, Judge Hand
feared that holding parties liable for anticompetitive behavior affecting the
United States regardless of the magnitude of its effect would result in an overly
broad interpretation of the Sherman Act.48 Second, Hand feared that finding
liability for any intentional acts targeting the United States despite the absence
of any anticompetitive effect would cause confusion by forcing lower courts to
decide between competing canons of statutory construction.49
To avoid these over-breadth and statutory construction concerns, Judge
Hand crafted a test that required both intent and an effect on the United States
to find a foreign entity liable under the Sherman Act. Specifically, Judge Hand
stated that “[b]oth [agreements] were unlawful, though made abroad, if they
were intended to affect imports and did affect them.”50 Using this new
standard, Hand found that the foreign aluminum producer’s agreements
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.51
42

Id. at 439.
Id. at 440.
44 Id. at 442–43.
45 The first agreement in 1931 created a system of quotas for aluminum ingot production, and a second
agreement in 1936 created a system of royalties to replace the initial “unconditional” quota system, which
forced the entity producing more than its fixed quota under the agreement to pay a royalty fee. Id. at 442–43.
46 Id. at 444.
47 Id. at 443.
48 Id. (“Almost any limitation of the supply of goods in Europe, for example, or in South America, may
have repercussions in the United States . . . . Yet when one considers the international complications likely to
arise from an effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress
certainly did not intend the Act to cover them.”).
49 Id. at 443–44 (“That situation might be thought to fall within the doctrine that intent may be a
substitute for performance in the case of a contract made within the United States; or it might be thought to fall
within the doctrine that a statute should not be interpreted to cover acts abroad which have no consequence
here.”).
50 Id. at 444.
51 Hand found that the parties involved in the earlier agreement did not intend to cover imports.
However, the latter agreement, which superseded the earlier agreement, clearly targeted the United States. Id.
43
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Alcoa was a groundbreaking opinion regarding the application of the
Sherman Act to foreign conduct, but it did not articulate a completely
satisfactory standard that could be applied to future cases. Judge Hand focused
on the effect that the conduct had on the United States but did not discuss how
much of an effect on the United States was required.52 The only guidance Hand
gave in determining whether the effect amounted to a Sherman Act violation
was that “we shall assume that the Act does not cover agreements, even though
they intended to affect imports or exports, unless its performance is shown
actually to have some effect on them.”53 Hand provided no guidance as to the
meaning of the “some effect” language of his opinion.54 Instead, under Hand’s
framework, a successful demonstration of intent to affect U.S. commerce
shifted the burden to the defendant to prove the conduct did not have an effect
on the United States to avoid liability under the antitrust laws.55 Instead of
remanding to the lower court to apply this new test, Hand denied Alcoa an
opportunity to demonstrate the lack of effect created in the United States. Hand
cited precedent dictating that no inquiry into price effects was required given a
finding of intent and dismissed statistics of the actual effects of the agreement
on U.S. commerce used in the lower court as non-conclusive.56 Hand’s opinion
seemed more concerned with whether the foreign party intended to affect the
United States than with either what the actual effect of the foreign conduct was
or how the standard created in Alcoa would be applied in subsequent decisions.
Judge Hand’s new focus on the relationship between the foreign conduct
and the effect on the United States had a lasting impact on the application of
United States antitrust law to foreign entities. However, the original standard
created in Alcoa requiring “some effect” on the United States failed to provide
satisfactory guidance to lower courts attempting to determine which effects
would result in liability. The lack of development into what facts and situations
would satisfy the “some effect” requirement caused uneven application of the
Alcoa “effects” test in subsequent lower court decisions57 and created the need
for Congressional intervention.

52

Id. at 444.
Id.
54 Id.
55 See id. at 444–45.
56 See id. (citing Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150 (1940)). Ironically, the statistics
demonstrated that gross domestic imports of aluminum had increased during the agreement. Id.
57 Compare Todhunter-Mitchell & Co., Ltd. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (framing the effects inquiry as whether conduct “directly affect[s] the flow of foreign commerce into or
out of the country”), with Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687
53
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B. Redefining the Effects Requirement: The Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act
Congress began its attempt to remedy the recurring issue of extraterritorial
application of the United States’ antitrust laws in March of 1981.58 From the
start, the sponsors59 of the FTAIA explained that a new law was needed to
remove uncertainty in the manner in which antitrust laws were applied to
conduct abroad.60 The FTAIA was passed in 1982.61 The law set out a new
effect standard for applying the Sherman Act to foreign actors: conduct which
“has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S.
commerce.62 The relevant63 section of the new restriction on the scope of the
Sherman Act read as follows:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade
or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with
foreign nations unless—
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or
commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or
import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce
in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of
sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of
the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title
shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the
United States.64

(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that the standard was such that “it is probably not necessary for the effect on foreign
commerce to be both substantial and direct as long as it is not de minimis”).
58 127 CONG. REC. 3538–39 (1981).
59 The Act’s cosponsors in the U.S. House of Representatives were Peter W. Rodino (N.J.) and Robert
McClory (Ill.). Id.
60 127 CONG. REC. 3538 (1981); see also H.R. REP. NO. 686, at 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2487, 2494 (“[T]he ultimate purpose of this legislation is to promote certainty in assessing the applicability of
American antitrust law to international business transactions and proposed transactions . . . .”).
61 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1233, 1246
(codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (2012)).
62 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
63 The statute also amended the Federal Trade Commission Act. § 403, 96 Stat. at 1246–47.
64 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
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While some courts have noted the awkward phrasing of the statute,65 the
Supreme Court in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. clarified how
courts should analyze claims under the FTAIA.66 The Court explained that the
FTAIA initially removes Sherman Act liability from all activities involving
foreign commerce.67 The statute, however, allows the Sherman Act to apply in
two distinct circumstances.68 First, Sherman Act liability applies to any
conduct by foreign entities that involves “import trade or import commerce.”69
In this instance, no other provisions of the FTAIA apply, and the court simply
assesses the conduct under the Sherman Act to determine whether a foreign
company is liable.70 Second, Sherman Act liability attaches to any conduct that
has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on American
commerce and when that effect “gives rise to a claim” under the Sherman
Act.71
The legislative history to the FTAIA stated that the “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” requirement in the statute was “a simple and
straightforward clarification of existing American law.”72 Yet the FTAIA
contained the same flaw as Judge Hand’s opinion in Alcoa––the operative
terms of the statute, including “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable,”
were not defined. Congress seemingly left the interpretation of these terms to
the courts, perpetuating the confusion that began with the Alcoa decision.
In addition to not defining the terms of the statute, Congress provided
limited guidance to the courts in the legislative history of the FTAIA. First, the
legislative history notes that the FTAIA was designed to incorporate certain
aspects of Judge Hand’s effects test, including focusing the basis of antitrust
liability on whether the conduct had an effect on the United States.73 Second,
the legislative history notes that the FTAIA was drafted to specifically reject
65

See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that the FTAIA is
“inelegantly phrased”).
66 542 U.S. 155, 161–62 (2004).
67 Id. at 162.
68 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
69 Id. at 161–62 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
70 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
71 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
72 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2487–88.
73 See id. at 2–3, 9–10 (noting that the FTAIA was intended to exempt from the Sherman Act export
transactions that did not injure the U.S. economy); id. at 9–10 (“[T]here should be no American antitrust
jurisdiction absent a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce or a domestic
competitor.”); id. at 5 (“Since Judge Learned Hand’s opinion . . . it has been relatively clear that it is the situs
of the effects . . . that determines whether U.S. antitrust law applies.”).
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Hand’s intent test, stating that “[t]he subcommittee chose a formulation based
on foreseeability rather than intent to make the standard an objective one.”74
Third, the legislative history addressed the potential violations caused by
“spillover” effects based on actions by an international cartel.75 Armed with a
new statute and limited legislative history, the courts were tasked with defining
how the effects requirement, first defined in Alcoa, was changed by the
FTAIA.
C. The FTAIA and the Courts: A Clearer Standard?
Following the passage of the FTAIA, subsequent treatment of the statute by
the courts perpetuated the confusion the statute sought to remedy. Lacking a
clear standard from Congress for the new “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable” language in the FTAIA, courts throughout the United States were
forced to define the phrase on their own. This section demonstrates how the
lack of guidance affected various courts’ attempts to define what a “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” is under the FTAIA. The first
subsection considers the two Supreme Court decisions that discuss the FTAIA
and demonstrates the limited interpretation and guidance the Court has
provided. The second subsection provides two examples of particularly lacking
interpretations of the FTAIA’s effects phrase to demonstrate interpretation
issues perpetuated by Congress and the Supreme Court in their treatment of the
FTAIA.
1. The Supreme Court and the FTAIA: Missed Opportunities
One important source of confusion concerning the FTAIA for the lower
courts has been the Supreme Court’s treatment of the FTAIA. The Supreme
Court has only taken two cases that raised issues under the FTAIA. Its first
opportunity to discuss the FTAIA was Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California.76 Hartford Fire involved a group of reinsurance companies in the
United Kingdom conspiring to manipulate insurance forms to deny coverage
for U.S. consumers.77 The Court noted that the reinsurers had apparently

74

Id. at 9.
Id. at 13 (“Any major activities of an international cartel would likely have the requisite impact on
United States commerce to trigger United States subject matter jurisdiction. For example, if a domestic export
cartel were so strong as to have a ‘spillover’ effect on commerce within this country . . . the cartel’s conduct
would fall within the reach of our antitrust laws.”).
76 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
77 Id. at 774–76.
75
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conceded jurisdiction78 and then went on to revive the Alcoa test by stating,
“[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign
conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial
effect in the United States.”79 In one sentence, the Supreme Court ignored the
FTAIA’s scope of application for U.S. antitrust laws abroad, electing instead to
resurrect the Alcoa standard.
The Court in Hartford Fire did, however, briefly discuss the FTAIA in a
footnote.80 Writing for the majority, Justice Souter noted that “it is unclear how
[the FTAIA] might apply to the conduct alleged here,”81 seemingly mimicking
Judge Hand’s approach in Alcoa in refusing to provide lower courts with an
example for future application of the FTAIA. Justice Souter also wrote that it
was unclear “whether the [FTAIA’s] ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect’ standard amends existing law or merely codifies it.”82 After
acknowledging the uncertainty contained within the FTAIA, Souter concluded
the footnote by stating that the court “need not address these questions here.”83
Thus, the Supreme Court acknowledged the issues facing lower courts in
interpreting the FTAIA but chose to avoid fixing these issues by utilizing the
Alcoa “effects” test as precedent and did not elaborate on the FTAIA.
The other opportunity for the Supreme Court to interpret the FTAIA came
in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.84 Beyond elaborating on how
the FTAIA functioned,85 the Court did not clarify how the “direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect” requirement in the FTAIA should be
defined. Instead, the Court found that the FTAIA did not allow Sherman Act
liability to attach when foreign conduct caused foreign harm and when that
foreign harm was the basis of the claim.86 The court justified its finding on two
grounds: (1) international comity, and (2) that “the FTAIA’s language and
history suggest that Congress designed the FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit,
but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied
to foreign commerce.”87 Thus, the Court in Empagran did not have the
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 795.
Id. at 796 (citing Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945)).
Id. at 796–97 n.23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
542 U.S. 155 (2004).
See supra text accompanying notes 67–71.
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 166.
Id. at 169.
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opportunity to clarify the FTAIA due to a unique set of circumstances. Because
no domestic effect was alleged, the Court did not have any “effect” to assess to
help demonstrate what “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” meant
in the context of a live case. Following Empagran, the Court has not taken an
appeal that presents a legal question concerning the FTAIA.
2. The Lower Courts and the FTAIA: Confusion and Variance
The majority of cases interpreting the FTAIA have come from the lower
courts. With limited guidance from Congress and the Supreme Court, lower
courts have been forced to give meaning to “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable” on their own.
Some courts have provided the text of the FTAIA within their opinions but
failed to develop the language within their analysis. Kruman v. Christie’s
International PLC involved price-fixing in foreign auctions.88 The court
provided a lengthy excerpt of the legislative history of the FTAIA and
acknowledged that the conduct must have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable” effect on U.S. commerce.89 Yet when the court discussed whether
the conduct of the auction houses met the standard set in the FTAIA, the
analysis was nonexistent. The court wrote that “it would be appropriate for the
United States to provide remedies for injuries suffered in consequence of overt
acts that occurred outside this country only if those acts . . . had direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects” and that such injuries “did not
occur in this case.”90 The court failed to support its decision that the standard
was not met with any discussion of the effects requirement in the FTAIA.91
Instead, the court continued discussing why extending the Sherman Act to this
action would be unsatisfactory and proceeded to respond to objections to their
ruling by the plaintiff.92 At no point in the opinion did the court state how the
conduct failed to meet the effects requirement of the FTAIA or why the
plaintiff’s theory did not prove that the conduct had the requisite effect.
While the court in Kruman left much to be desired in determining why the
effect was not “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable,” the court at
least answered whether the standard was met. In contrast, in In re Monosodium
88

129 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002)
(affirming antitrust liability under the FTAIA).
89 Id. at 624–25.
90 Id. at 625–26.
91 Id. at 626.
92 Id.
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Glutamate Antitrust Litigation,93 the court began by discussing causation
before ever defining what the effect on the United States was and whether this
effect fulfilled the FTAIA.94 In this case, the plaintiff claimed that a global
price-fixing scheme had exerted “direct and substantial” effects on the price of
MSG in the United States.95 The court echoed some of the effects requirement
language of the FTAIA when it said, “Plaintiffs allege that prices in the United
States were directly and substantially linked to prices Plaintiffs paid,”96 but the
analysis seemed to go to causation rather than effect.97 There was no
discussion of whether the price-fixing conduct abroad caused the effect of
increased prices in the United States,98 much less whether that effect was the
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” consequence of the conduct.
The court denied the motion to dismiss, thereby confirming that the plaintiff
had met the FTAIA effect standard without discussing what evidence the
plaintiff brought forward to prove the first prong of the FTAIA and how that
evidence was satisfactory.99
Kruman and Monosodium Glutamate present extreme examples of courts
ignoring the FTAIA. Most lower courts interpret at least one part of the “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” standard.100 Nevertheless, these
decisions all support a common theme: the FTAIA has suffered from a lack of
a clearly defined effects standard since its inception. While other sections of
the statute have subsequently been given a uniform definition by the courts,101
the requirement that foreign conduct have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” on American commerce remains largely undefined, and
courts fail to analyze each operative phrase in the requirement separately.
Therefore, a unified definition of “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable” is necessary to fully enable the FTAIA to function as Congress

93

No. Civ.00MDL1328(PAM), 2005 WL 1080790 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005), aff’d, 447 F.3d 535 (8th Cir.

2007).
94

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *1.
96 Id. at *4.
97 The court immediately followed the quoted passage by stating that “[t]hese allegations aver a far more
direct causal relationship between the domestic effect and Plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at *5.
98 The increase in prices was the apparent “effect” under the FTAIA.
99 Id. at *8.
100 See, e.g., CSR Ltd. v. CIGNA Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 526, 549–50 (D.N.J. 2005) (finding that the
effects of an Australian entity were not sufficiently “direct” without discussing “substantial” or “reasonably
foreseeable”).
101 See, e.g., supra note 8 (discussing the District of Columbia’s treatment of the “gives rise to” element
of the FTAIA when considering Empagran on remand).
95
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intended it to: by preventing every possible effect caused by foreign conduct
from serving as the basis for an antitrust claim in the United States.
II. A NEW, UNIFIED STANDARD FOR INTERPRETING THE FOREIGN TRADE
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
While the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act was intended to be “a
simple and straightforward clarification”102 of the situations in which foreign
conduct would give rise to liability under American antitrust laws, the resulting
interpretations of the effects requirement have only caused more confusion.
Lacking guidance from the text of the statute, its accompanying legislative
history, and Supreme Court opinions, most courts refuse to acknowledge,
much less develop, the effects requirement under the FTAIA. Those opinions
that have developed the effects language often only focus on one of the words
contained in the clause without elaborating on the definition of the other words
in the effects test.
This Part proposes a new, unified standard for interpreting the “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” requirement of the FTAIA.
Courts should perform an analysis of each operative phrase within the effects
requirement to determine whether the defendant’s conduct caused a sufficient
effect on the United States. First, conduct is “direct” if it proximately causes
the effect in the United States. Second, conduct is “substantial” if the alleged
anticompetitive conduct’s effect on the price and volume of the good in the
United States is in turn “substantial.” Third, conduct is “reasonably
foreseeable” if an objective businessperson could foresee the conduct affecting
the United States. These tests, when applied together, yield an interpretation of
the FTAIA courts can apply uniformly.
This Part will develop the proposed standards for the “direct,”
“substantial,” and “reasonably foreseeable” language within the FTAIA in
three separate sections.103 Within each section discussing the specific phrases,
the discussion will include three subsections: (1) a survey of current
interpretations of the phrase by courts,104 (2) a discussion of how the adopted
standard best serves the purpose of the FTAIA,105 and (3) a test case where the
proposed standard was either successfully used or the analysis by the court
102
103
104
105

H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2487–88.
See infra Part II.A, B, C.
See infra Part II.A.1, B.1, C.1.
See infra Part II.A.2, B.2, C.2.
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closely mirrors the method proposed by this Comment.106 This Part will
conclude with a discussion of Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Argium, Inc.,107 a recent
decision that most closely exhibits the analysis using the unified standard
proposed by this Comment.108
A. Direct
The inclusion of a directness requirement represents a change from the
Alcoa effects standard to the FTAIA.109 Under Alcoa, it was sufficient to show
that the conduct “did affect” U.S. commerce.110 Congress acknowledged this
change within the legislative history by stating that applying Sherman Act
liability to conduct which caused indirect effects that fit the Alcoa definition111
would be a “miscarriage of Congressional intent.”112 Beyond this guidance,
Congress left the task of defining how “direct” the effect must be to the lower
courts.
This section develops the “proximate cause” standard that courts should use
to determine whether an effect is “direct” under the FTAIA. The first
subsection discusses the two ways the lower courts have interpreted “direct”
thus far, specifically reviewing how courts apply the “immediate consequence”
standard and the “proximate cause” standard to assess whether the alleged
anticompetitive effect was “direct.”113 The second subsection presents the
argument for why the “proximate cause” standard is the optimal standard for
interpreting the “direct” requirement set out by the FTAIA.114 Finally, the third
subsection reintroduces the Intel Corp. Microprocessor decision as a test case
for the new standard.115
1. Courts’ Interpretations of “Direct”
Lower courts have interpreted “direct” in two distinct manners. One
method is to find that conduct causes a direct effect if the effect is “an
106

See infra Part II.A.3, B.3, C.3.
683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
108 See infra Part II.D.
109 United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Unlike the FTAIA, the Alcoa test
does not require the effect to be ‘direct.’”).
110 Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
111 Foreign conduct was illegal “if [it was] intended to affect imports and did affect them.” Id.
112 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490.
113 See infra Part II.A.1.
114 See infra Part II.A.2.
115 See infra Part II.A.3.
107
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immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity.”116 The Ninth Circuit took
this interpretation from two sources: the dictionary and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.117 The court turned to
Republic of Argentina, a case which interpreted provisions of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act,118 because the court found the language in dispute
in Republic of Argentina was “nearly identical” to the language used in the
FTAIA.119 The “immediate consequence” standard requires that the
anticompetitive conduct immediately cause the effect on U.S. commerce.120
The effect would not qualify as “direct” under this standard if there were any
intervening events between the anticompetitive conduct and the effect on U.S.
commerce.121 This “immediate consequence” standard for a direct effect has
been adopted by courts within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit122 as well as
by other federal courts.123
The other method applied by courts in determining directness is the
“proximate cause” approach.124 The Seventh Circuit adopted the definition
used by the Department of Justice, which defined a “direct” effect as an effect
having “a reasonably proximate causal nexus” with the anticompetitive
conduct.125 The court accepted the proximate cause standard as being more in
line with the language of the FTAIA than the “immediate consequence”

116 United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992), and WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640
(1980)).
117 Id.
118 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988) (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012)).
119 LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 680.
120 Id. at 680–82.
121 Id.
122 See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
123 See, e.g., CSR Ltd. v. CIGNA Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 526, 545 (D.N.J. 2005).
124 Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This proximate
cause is different from the proximate cause standard used by courts in analyzing the “gives rise to a claim”
language of the FTAIA. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2012). In theory, this creates a proximate cause “two-step”: the
court must first determine if the conduct proximately caused the effect on the United States, and then must
determine if that effect proximately caused the claim that the plaintiff brings forward.
125 See Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 856–57 (citing Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman
Act: Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 415, 430 (2005), and Brief for Appellant United States of America at 38, United States v. LSL
Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-16472), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/
f200200/200243.pdf).
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approach since it more squarely addressed126 the concerns of remoteness that
came with the extension of Sherman Act liability to activity abroad.127
2. The Best Approach Under a Unified Standard: Proximate Cause
The contrasting tests announced by the Seventh Circuit in Minn-Chem and
the Ninth Circuit in LSL Biotechnologies create uncertainty for which standard
courts will apply in determining if an effect is “direct.” Instead of randomly
choosing between these standards, all courts should adopt the Minn-Chem
“proximate cause” standard. The Minn-Chem “proximate cause” standard more
accurately addresses the concerns of Congress while giving the FTAIA an
appropriate scope.
As the Seventh Circuit acknowledges, the “immediate consequence”
standard put forward in LSL Biotechnologies does not match the FTAIA.128
The phrase “immediate consequence” comes from the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a statute that does not
require “substantial” or “reasonably foreseeable” effects alongside “direct.”129
Interpreting “direct” to mean an “immediate consequence” of the defendant’s
actions in the context of the FTAIA would essentially eliminate the distinction
between conduct involving imports and conduct affecting imports.130 Conduct
involving import trade or commerce, such as importing a price-fixed good into
the United States, bypasses the procedural requirements of the FTAIA and
goes straight to Sherman Act analysis.131 Conduct affecting import trade or
commerce, such as price-fixing a good outside of the United States such that
prices within the United States rise in response must fulfill the additional
requirements of the FTAIA.132 The “immediate consequences” interpretation
of “direct” blurs this line to an unworkable degree and frustrates attempts to
clarify the FTAIA.133

126 Id. at 857–58. The approach of the Seventh Circuit may actually cause more concern about
remoteness than the LSL Biotechnologies test, depending on whether one views “proximate cause” or
“immediate consequence” as a clearer, more applicable standard.
127 Id. at 857.
128 Id. at 856–57.
129 Id. at 857.
130 Id. at 857–58.
131 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
132 Id.
133 Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857 (“To demand a foreseeable, substantial, and ‘immediate’ consequence on
import or domestic commerce comes close to ignoring the fact that straightforward import commerce has
already been excluded from the FTAIA’s coverage.”).
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Courts should instead use the “proximate cause” standard of the Seventh
Circuit when determining if conduct has a direct effect on U.S. commerce.134
The “proximate cause” standard preserves the import exemption while creating
a workable standard. Courts could employ the approach demonstrated in
Minn-Chem by listing out the chain of events between the conduct and the
effect in the United States and then explaining either why the chain
demonstrates a direct effect or at what point in the chain the effect becomes
indirect.135
The only hesitation courts should have with adopting the “proximate cause”
standard is due to its name: proximate cause is often a consideration in
foreseeability, and it is important to give both FTAIA terms “direct” and
“reasonably foreseeable” meaning. The court in Minn-Chem noted that the
directness language in the FTAIA was meant to address remoteness concerns
and that using a “reasonably proximate causal nexus” standard adequately
remedied these concerns.136 The court discussed foreseeability in a different
section of the opinion and applied a different test to assess whether the conduct
had a “reasonably foreseeable” effect on U.S. commerce.137 While the name
may elicit some confusion when first used by the courts, use of the phrase
should become more commonplace as long as courts continue to note that the
proximate cause in the directness inquiry is separate from proximate cause in
the foreseeability inquiry.
Requiring courts to acknowledge the chain of events connecting the
anticompetitive conduct to the effect on U.S. commerce makes the FTAIA’s
directness requirement easier for courts to apply and others to understand. By
documenting the chain of events from the anticompetitive conduct to that
conduct’s effect on U.S. commerce and signaling when that chain becomes
indirect, courts put the burden on practitioners to develop a careful chain of
events by which the international anticompetitive conduct is linked to the
harmful effect in the United States. The court then examines this chain of
events to make the proximate cause assessment and determine if the conduct
“directly” affects the United States.
134 The Second Circuit recently had the opportunity to review a lower court’s decision to apply LSL
Biotechnologies instead of Minn-Chem. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 409–13
(2d Cir. 2014). While the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of an FTAIA claim, its lengthy
discussion favoring the Minn-Chem approach over LSL Biotechnologies aligns with the recommendations of
this Comment.
135 See Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 859.
136 See id. at 856–57.
137 See id. at 856, 859.
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3. The Standard in Practice: Intel Corp. Microprocessor
An example of the “proximate cause” standard in practice will help
illuminate the benefits of this proposal. Although the opinion did not
specifically refer to the “proximate cause” standard, the court in Intel Corp.
Microprocessor applied an analysis similar to this Comment’s proposed
proximate cause standard.138 The court in Intel addressed an international cartel
that fixed the price of microprocessors.139 The court specifically focused on the
directness of the conduct of the plaintiff and the effect in the United States.
The theory advanced by the plaintiff involved a long, convoluted set of actions
between the defendant’s alleged anticompetitive conduct and the alleged effect
on U.S. commerce. The plaintiff’s allegations, as characterized by the
defendant and adopted by the court, were that
a deal between Intel and a German retailer to promote Intel-based
systems directly affect [sic] U.S. commerce because it reduces
AMD’s German subsidiary’s sales of German-made microprocessors
in Germany, which in turn affects the profitability of the U.S. AMD
parent, which in turn affects the funds that AMD has for discounting
to U.S. customers, which in turn affects the discounts that it offers in
particular U.S. transactions, which in turn affects its competitiveness
in the United States, and which in turn affects U.S. commerce.140

After restating the lengthy chain of events proposed by the plaintiff, the court
rejected the directness claim because of the “speculative and changing factors”
involved, including issues with financing, research, and political and economic
conditions.141
The decision in Intel is a model for how this Comment’s endorsed standard
should operate. By focusing on the chain of events between the defendant’s
conduct and the effect on the United States, the court provided a definitive
answer as to why the connection was not sufficiently “direct.”142 Intel
demonstrates how early decisions under the standard would help practitioners:
future claimants under the FTAIA would know that decisions that involve the
“speculative and changing factors” mentioned in the opinion will be viewed
skeptically by the court.143 As more cases involving the FTAIA come before
138
139
140
141
142
143

In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 560–61 (D. Del. 2006).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 560 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 560–61.
Id.
Id.
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the courts, the definition of “direct” would be refined to such a degree that the
standard would be satisfactorily clear to practitioners.
Certainly, this factually intensive, case-by-case analysis may not be an
immediate improvement over the current unclear approach a court might take
in assessing the FTAIA’s directness requirement. However, as courts begin to
put forward chains of contact between foreign conduct and effects in the
United States, more defined standards would begin to develop. Additionally,
continued use of the “proximate cause” standard as a test for determining
directness would remedy any potential name confusion between the
“proximate cause” standard and the foreseeability standard. Therefore, courts
should apply a standard whereby the court requires a detailed description of the
link and should include that description with their opinion along with their
proximate cause determination of whether the conduct directly causes the
effect.
B. Substantial
Unlike “direct” and “reasonably foreseeable,” the “substantial” requirement
of the FTAIA is a remnant of the effects test articulated in Alcoa.144 From its
beginning, practitioners took a fact-intensive approach to demonstrating
substantiality.145 Judge Hand’s opinion in Alcoa required that the
anticompetitive conduct have some level of impact on the United States market
but provided no useful metric by which to measure that effect.146 The
legislative history is similarly sparse. While the drafters noted that
“[p]resumably a de minimis standard creates a lower threshold than a
‘substantial effects’ test,” this is the only discussion of the “substantial” effect
requirement separate from the language adopted by the FTAIA.147 While an
144

The legislative history of the FTAIA approves of Hand’s effects test in Alcoa but goes on to reject the
subjective intent requirement in favor of reasonable foreseeability. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490. Further, the court in LSL Biotechnologies noted the “direct”
requirement of the FTAIA was not present in Alcoa. United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th
Cir. 2004). Therefore, the only remaining element that could refer to the Alcoa system endorsed by the drafters
is the “substantiality” requirement. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5.
That “substantiality” comes from Alcoa is ironic given the lack of guidance Judge Hand provided for
applying the “effects” test in the opinion. Perhaps the “substantiality” basis from Alcoa consisted of Hand
requiring “some effect” from the foreign conduct in order to find liability. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir.
1945).
145 See 148 F.2d at 444–45 (using statistics to attempt to prove effect of conduct).
146 Instead, Judge Hand shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that the cartel did not have any effect
on the market. Id. at 444.
147 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 6.
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effect that has a greater than de minimis impact is a starting point for creating a
standard for what “substantial” means, it leaves much to be desired.
This section develops the “price and volume” standard, which courts
should use to determine whether an effect is “substantial” under the FTAIA.
The first subsection demonstrates two examples of the fact-intensive inquiry
courts usually use to determine “substantiality.”148 The second subsection
argues for the “price and volume” standard to interpret “substantial” within the
context of the FTAIA.149 Finally, the third subsection utilizes the United
Phosphorus decision to demonstrate a model application of the “price and
volume” standard.150
1. Courts’ Interpretations of “Substantial”
Courts that have discussed the substantiality of the effects created by
foreign anticompetitive conduct often provide a highly factual account of what
actually occurred in the U.S. marketplace. In re Static Random Access Memory
(SRAM) Antitrust Litigation involved a price-fixing conspiracy that targeted
the U.S. market.151 In its discussion of the conduct by the defendants, the court
noted that one defendant alone billed or shipped over $1.7 billion of SRAM to
the United States.152 While the court did not specifically acknowledge that this
figure went to the substantiality of the effect of the alleged anticompetitive
conduct, this figure likely helped the court determine that the effect was
sufficient to find that this conduct fell within the FTAIA.
A lack of substantiality can enable courts to deny liability under the
FTAIA. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc. involved a price-fixing
claim based on a noncompete clause signed between producers of tomato
seeds.153 The discussion of the court, which focused in part on the relationship
of the seeds to the tomatoes that they produced, seemed to allow the court to
attack the substantiality of the effect this noncompete clause had on the U.S.
market. The court noted that a large quantity of tomatoes produced by the
defendants never even made it to the United States.154 Even for those tomatoes
148
149
150
151
152
153

See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.3.
No. 07–md–01819 CW, 2010 WL 5477313, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010).
Id. at *5.
No. 00CV529, 2002 WL 3115336 at *1, *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2002), aff’d, 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir.

2004).
154

Id. at *6.

BIFULCO GALLEYSPROOFS2

894

2/19/2015 12:37 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:869

that did make it to the United States, the price-fixed seeds constituted less than
1% of the final cost of the tomato, thereby discrediting any argument that the
effect of this noncompete clause was substantial.155 Thus, the court used the
lack of a substantial effect on the United States as a reason to find the effect
insufficient to warrant antitrust liability under the FTAIA.
2. The Best Approach Under a Unified Standard: Price and Volume
The examples from SRAM and LSL Biotechnologies demonstrate an
analysis of “substantial” effects that creates a double-edged sword. While the
courts in these cases actually provide a discussion of what makes the effect of
the anticompetitive conduct on U.S. commerce substantial, their fact-based
inquiries do not provide a standard that courts could apply uniformly beyond
the facts of a particular case. But any substantiality analysis of the effect of
anticompetitive conduct will need to be fact intensive. To remedy this issue,
courts should focus on two factual categories: (1) whether the conduct has an
effect on the price of the good in the United States, and (2) the total volume of
the good that enters the United States.
After a plaintiff satisfactorily alleges a “direct” connection between the
conduct and the effect, the substantiality evaluation should provide the court a
framework to measure the effect’s magnitude. The focus of the substantiality
inquiry should be on the effect the conduct has on the price and volume of the
good available.
There is an economic justification for focusing on these effects. A common
price manipulation implicated in antitrust violations is an artificial inflation of
prices above market equilibrium.156 In this situation, supply and demand for
the product move in opposite directions in response to the artificial inflation:
while demand drops, supply increases.157 Under perfect competition, price
would move back toward the original market equilibrium when firms changed
to alternative suppliers willing to provide the good at the prevailing market
155

Id.
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority, 46 INT’L
ECON. REV. 145, 145 (2005).
157 When antitrust violators engage in cartel behavior, they fix a higher market price. Because less
quantity is demanded at the higher price point, society incurs a deadweight loss. In the event that the cartel
does not have full control over the market price, transaction costs may also be a barrier to affected buyers. See,
e.g., William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury,
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 478–79 (1980); John G. Ranlett & Robert L. Curry, Jr., Economic Principles:
Monopoly, Oligopoly, and Competition Models, ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Spring 1968, at 107, 138.
156
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price. However, due to cartel activity preventing the availability of other
suppliers or high transaction costs in changing suppliers, many of the
entities158 that would have standing to bring claims under the FTAIA would
not have the luxury of switching immediately to buying other goods at the
new, and lower, equilibrium market price.159 These entities would be unable to
switch immediately to a supplier offering the good at a lower price due to high
transaction costs.160 Therefore, the inflated price will cause harm to the
plaintiff with standing to bring the suit.
Another common market manipulation that gives rise to antitrust liability
includes restricting the amount of the good produced from reaching the
market.161 Such a reduction of volume has an effect regardless of whether the
good produced anticompetitively is a smaller component of a finished product
or a final good that is sold directly to consumers. By reducing supply,
anticompetitive firms enjoy a higher equilibrium price for the duration of the
production shortage. Again, those with standing to bring claims likely cannot
immediately shift to a new supplier and must therefore either pay the higher
price or provide less of the good to the consumers it services. Therefore, the
court can use the increased price paid by the plaintiffs or the decreased output
by the plaintiff as a representation of how “substantial” the effect is on the
plaintiff. By demonstrating this effect across multiple competitors, the plaintiff
can further demonstrate how the conduct “substantially” affects the United
States.
While this calculation may seem complicated and convoluted, it is already
employed by courts and parties and is thus a workable solution. Parties and
government agencies that successfully bring antitrust claims must often
provide an initial remedy for the court to evaluate.162 If successful, the plaintiff

158

This applies to both private parties and the United States government.
See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (stating that price
increases abroad “almost immediately” increased prices for U.S. imports).
160 See generally Paul J. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 95, 96, 103 (2002) (explaining a transaction cost approach to valuing remedies and general
barriers imposed by transaction costs in market violations). Examples of transaction costs that infringe upon
the ability of companies to purchase other goods at the market price include being bound by a contract or
having to spend time searching for new suppliers.
161 Page, supra note 157, at 478–79.
162 See, e.g., Complaint at 38–39, Gage’s Fertilizer & Grain, Inc. v. Agrium Inc. (In re Potash Antitrust
Litig. (II)), 667 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (No. 1:08-cv-06910).
159

BIFULCO GALLEYSPROOFS2

896

2/19/2015 12:37 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:869

then provides a more detailed remedy for the court to evaluate.163 This “price
and volume” standard for measuring substantiality roughly mirrors the
calculations used in proposing these remedies. While asking plaintiffs to
calculate remedies at an earlier stage in the proceeding may be onerous, courts
would benefit greatly from such information earlier in the proceedings. If
courts already found the effect to be sufficiently direct, plaintiffs’ ability to
immediately present the substantiality of the effect would keep plaintiffs from
hiding the exact magnitude of the price or volume effect alleged from the judge
until the end of the trial. Therefore, the “price and volume” standard would
create a clearer understanding of what plaintiffs must present in order for the
effect of the anticompetitive conduct to be found sufficiently “substantial”
under the FTAIA.
3. The Standard in Practice: United Phosphorus
The courts that discuss substantiality in their opinions usually do not
provide the detailed discussion suggested by the “price and volume”
standard.164 The rare instance in which the necessary figures are assessed
demonstrates the merits of the “price and volume” standard.
United Phosphorus involved a claim concerning chemicals used in the creation
of tuberculosis medicine.165 Companies from India attempted to show that the
defendant prevented the sale of the chemicals to individuals throughout the
world, including the United States.166 In rejecting the claim due to failure to
satisfy the effects requirement of the FTAIA, the court focused on how little of
the chemical was actually purchased in the United States.167 Even before the
alleged anticompetitive activity by the defendant, only one company in the
United States purchased the chemical.168 The U.S. company’s purchases
represented 0.4% of the world’s production of the chemical, which totaled less
163

See, e.g., Sentencing Memorandum at 7–30, United States v. AU Optronics Corp., No. CR-09-0110 SI
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012), 2012 WL 3966339 (providing a detailed explanation of the penalty calculation
based upon market impact).
164 See Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 325 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2003). Whether the
lack of detail is a function of the style of the opinion as written or a lack of discussion in the pleadings is
unclear. However, this standard encourages judges to include the pertinent facts used to determine
“substantiality” in their opinions for purposes of clarity and ease of access.
165 United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2001), aff’d, 322
F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (stating that United Phosphorus improperly found the FTAIA to set forth a jurisdictional
limit on power of the federal courts instead of an element of the antitrust claim).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1013.
168 Id. at 1012.
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than $25,000.169 The court accordingly rejected the antitrust claim since the
alleged anticompetitive conduct lacked a “substantial” effect on U.S.
commerce.170
The approach taken by the court in United Phosphorus serves as a useful
model of how the proposed “price and volume” standard to assess
substantiality should be applied. The court discussed how the plaintiffs’ claim
did not fulfill the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” prong of the
FTAIA, but the specific focus of its inquiry was on the “substantial” aspect of
the statute.171 The court then provided hard figures on how small the effect
truly was before dismissing the claim.172 By providing this information
explicitly within the opinion, the court sent a clear signal as to what type of
foreign conduct would not meet the substantiality requirement under the
FTAIA.
C. Reasonably Foreseeable
Of the three operative phrases included in the first prong of the FTAIA,
“reasonably foreseeable” would seem to be the easiest to define. Congress
dedicated an entire section of the legislative history of the FTAIA to the
“reasonably foreseeable” requirement and developed a fairly sophisticated
definition of the phrase in two specific passages.173 The House Report stated
that “[t]he test is whether the effects would have been evident to a reasonable
person making practical business judgments, not whether actual knowledge or
intent can be shown.”174 The legislative history goes on to state that “a
defendant confronted with evidence that his past conduct has had direct and
substantial effects within this country could not argue that continued effects of
this type flowing from similar future conduct were not ‘reasonably
foreseeable.’”175 Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the phrase inconsistently
despite Congress’s guidance on the meaning of the language.

169

Id. at 1013.
See id.
171 See id. The connection was clearly direct, seeing as any changes to the market for the chemical was
likely to affect the only consumer in the United States. The connection was also reasonably foreseeable on
similar grounds. Id.
172 Id.
173 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 8–9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2493–94.
174 Id. at 9.
175 Id.
170
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This section develops the “objective businessperson” standard that courts
should use in determining whether an effect is “reasonably foreseeable” under
the FTAIA. The first subsection demonstrates the subjective and objective
approaches taken by the courts following the passage of the FTAIA.176 The
second subsection presents the argument for the “objective businessperson”
standard for interpreting “reasonably foreseeable” within the context of the
FTAIA.177 Finally, the third subsection utilizes the SRAM decision to
demonstrate a model application of the proposed standard.178
1. Courts’ Interpretations of “Reasonably Foreseeable”
Courts that specifically interpret the “reasonably foreseeable” phrase of the
effects requirement of the FTAIA utilize one of two standards. One method of
interpretation involves endorsing the subjective intent requirement discussed in
Alcoa.179 This method was employed by the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire, a
case that seemingly involved a foreign anticompetitive conspiracy within the
scope of the FTAIA.180 Justice Souter, however, found the international firms
liable under Alcoa, stating, “[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman
Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States.”181 Souter briefly
addressed the FTAIA in a footnote, explaining that even if the FTAIA differed
from Alcoa, the conduct in this case clearly fulfilled the requirements of the
statute.182 Lower courts have also endorsed this perpetuation of the Alcoa
intent standard.183
The other method of interpreting the “reasonably foreseeable” requirement
is to give the phrase an objective meaning. In Animal Science Products, Inc. v.
China Minmetals Corp., the Third Circuit reviewed a case in which plaintiffs
claimed a group of international firms conspired to fix the price of

176

See infra Part II.C.1.
See infra Part II.C.2.
178 See infra Part II.C.3.
179 Judge Hand explained that the agreements in Alcoa were unlawful “if they were intended to affect
imports and did affect them.” Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
180 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 774–76 (1993).
181 Id. at 796.
182 Id. at 796–97 n.23 (“Also unclear is whether the Act’s ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect’ standard amends existing law or merely codifies it. We need not address these questions here.
Assuming that the FTAIA’s standard affects this litigation, and assuming further that that standard differs from
the prior law, the conduct alleged plainly meets its requirements.” (citation omitted)).
183 See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 2012).
177
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magnesite.184 The lower court dismissed the complaint in part based on the
inability of the parties to prove that the cartel intended to affect U.S.
commerce.185 The Third Circuit noted that “the FTAIA’s effects exception
does not contain a ‘subjective intent’ requirement” and went on to explain that
“the FTAIA’s ‘reasonably foreseeable’ language imposes an objective
standard: the requisite ‘direct’ and ‘substantial’ effect must have been
‘foreseeable’ to an objectively reasonable person. The text of the statute—
‘reasonably foreseeable’—makes plain that an objective standard applies.”186
The court vacated and remanded the issue to the lower court, stating that the
standard for “reasonably foreseeable” was “whether the alleged domestic effect
would have been evident to a reasonable person making practical business
judgments.”187
2. The Best Approach Under a Unified Standard: The Objective
Businessperson
Applying an objective standard to determine whether the effect caused by
the foreign conduct is “reasonably foreseeable” best serves the purpose and
function of the FTAIA. An objective standard gives the language the meaning
intended by Congress while creating a proper bar for certain foreign behavior.
The subjective standard can potentially hinder the effectiveness of the
FTAIA because it may be both narrower and broader than the objective
standard. On one side is the situation in which the plaintiff successfully
demonstrates that the defendant intended its conduct to affect the United
States. In this scenario, the objective and subjective tests align: the company
can be presumed to be a “reasonable person making practical business
judgments.”188 It is likely that Hartford Fire falls into this category because
184

654 F.3d 462, 464 (3d Cir. 2011). Magnesite is a mineral “used, among other things, to melt steel,
make cement, and clean wastewater.” Id. at 464 n.1.
185 Animal Sci. Prods., 702 F. Supp. 2d at 349. The court also interpreted substantial to include an intent
requirement: specifically that “defendants’ conduct was actually ‘intended/consciously meant’” to produce an
effect in the United States. Id. at 338 (citations omitted).
186 Id. at 471.
187 Id.
188 See id. In this instance the standards not only align but the subjective standard is broader than the
objective standard. Under an objective standard, a wise attorney would bring forward a few business people to
demonstrate the foreseeability of the effects of the defendant’s conduct on the United States. A court may
question any attorney who only brings forward one individual for their foreseeability demonstration. However,
if the defendant is the one person who is brought forward, the court would have little doubt as to whether the
effect of the anticompetitive conduct was reasonably foreseeable. In this way, the subjective standard is
broader than the objective standard.
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evidence of subjective intent provided ample justification for Justice Souter’s
quick handling of the claim under the Alcoa effects test189 and “plainly met the
requirements” of the FTAIA.190 Thus, courts would properly find defendants
liable of antitrust violations under the FTAIA if they intended their actions to
affect the United States.
The issue with the subjective standard and the FTAIA arises when the
plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant intended its conduct to have a
domestic effect. In this scenario, the analysis under the objective and
subjective tests can produce different results. While the company may still be
presumed to be an objective entity, its individual lack of foreseeability does not
dictate that every company or “reasonable person making practical business
judgments” is also ignorant of the potential effects.191 The FTAIA’s legislative
history illustrates this concern when it explains that “[a]n intent test might
encourage ignorance of the consequences of one’s actions, which in this
context, would be an undesirable result.”192 This concern was echoed in
Animal Science Products, where the lower court dismissed the claim because
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the subjective intent of the defendant to
affect the United States.193 On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded,
holding that the correct inquiry focused on whether the effect of the
anticompetitive conduct was objectively foreseeable, a requirement that could
be met by the plaintiff without demonstrating subjective intent.194 Thus, the
subjective standard conflicts with the objective standard in that a party can still
meet its requirements under an objective test even if it cannot prove the
subjective intent of the defendant.
This Comment’s proposed standard, the “objective businessperson”
standard, focuses on the key modifier included in the legislative history: the
effects should be foreseeable to a person “making practical business

189

See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795–96 (1993).
See id. at 796–97 n.23.
191 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2494. In this instance, the
subjective test would be narrower than the objective test. The possibility of false negatives in this scenario,
where anticompetitive conduct would be incorrectly viewed to have a reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S.
commerce, provides a compelling reason why the subjective standard should not be used to analyze the
FTAIA’s reasonably foreseeable requirement.
192 Id.
193 Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320,
349 (D.N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 471 (3d
Cir. 2011).
194 See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 471.
190
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judgments.”195 Courts should repeatedly emphasize this important modifier to
the reasonable person. By including this language in the FTAIA’s legislative
history in their formation of the test they suggested was appropriate, the
FTAIA’s drafters focused on a narrow group of people to shape the scope of a
standard into which most business activity would fall.
The narrow group of people that the legislative history mentions should fall
into two categories. First, there are those working for the defendant who are
familiar with how the entity operates and interacts with the markets. These
people would logically be involved in making “practical business judgments”
since their actions dictate the entity’s function on a day-to-day basis.196
Second, there are those who are intimately familiar with the industry in which
the defendant operates. These individuals, who would likely include bankers
and large investors, may have a better perspective of the potential effects of
anticompetitive conduct in regards to the FTAIA. Because they are familiar
with numerous entities within the market but are also outsiders, they would
view the market without the narrow focus of a company within the market.
Accordingly, each of these groups of individuals should be considered a person
“making practical business judgments” under the language of the FTAIA.197
In determining what is “reasonably foreseeable” under the “objective
businessperson” standard, the judge would focus on the chain of actions
between the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant and the effect on the
United States. It is important to differentiate the inquiry required in this
instance from the inquiry used to determine if an effect was “direct,” since the
proposed “proximate cause” test for directness is named similarly to a test
often used in determining foreseeability. Under a “proximate cause” directness
inquiry, the court would look at the chain of events and determine whether that
chain supports a finding of directness.198 In a “reasonably foreseeable” inquiry,
the court determines whether the chain itself is foreseeable to an objective
businessperson. These individual inquiries, along with the “substantial”
analysis, would form the basis of FTAIA applicability under this Comment’s
proposal.

195

H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9.
There is a strong argument that not all individuals within an entity would qualify as making “practical
business judgments.” As formulated, this Comment suggests the proper test to determine which individuals are
liable would mirror considerations used by the courts to determine who is an insider when assessing insider
trading under Rule 10b-5. That discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
197 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9.
198 See supra Part II.A.2–3.
196
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The proposed “objective businessperson” standard is a heightened form of
the reasonable person standard. Applying the “objective businessperson”
standard creates a greater likelihood that the activities performed by a foreign
entity would come under antitrust scrutiny. But, as the global economy
becomes more complicated, it will be harder for objective businesspeople to
assess the effects of anticompetitive conduct on the U.S. economy and thus to
“reasonably foresee” these effects. Concluding that the anticompetitive effects
on U.S. commerce will become harder for objective businesspeople to foresee
is admittedly not intuitive: as the world economy becomes more
interconnected and markets near perfect competition, it will be easier to find an
effect on U.S. commerce resulting from anticompetitive conduct. However, the
effect on U.S. commerce resulting from anticompetitive conduct may only
come after multiple steps in a chain of events, thereby making it in fact harder
for objective businesspeople to foresee the chain of events between the
anticompetitive conduct and the effect on U.S. commerce.
This is especially likely given the chains of events that plaintiffs would put
forward under the “direct” element of the unified standard. In contrast to the
objective businessperson, a reasonable person is unlikely to foresee that a
chain of events, which meets the “proximate cause” standard for directness,
can cause the effect required under the FTAIA. A reasonable person standard
would constrict the FTAIA, rendering it less effective than currently enforced.
Therefore, the “objective businessperson” standard strikes the proper balance
of implicating foreign conduct which is reasonably foreseeable to effect U.S.
commerce to individuals familiar with the practices of an entity while not
demanding plaintiffs demonstrate subjective intent to effect U.S. commerce.
3. The Standard in Practice: Static Random Access Memory
While Animal Science Products was remanded on the issue of
foreseeability, the lower court never wrote an opinion applying the objective
standard set forth by the Third Circuit. In SRAM, the Northern District of
California assessed whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct was
reasonably foreseeable in a way that closely resembles the “objective
businessperson” test.199 SRAM involved an international cartel accused of
inflating the price of SRAM computer chips.200 While discussing defendant’s

199 In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-md-01819 CW, 2010 WL
5477313 at *2, *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010).
200 Id. at *1.
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intent to target the United States, the court explained that “an inchoate hope or
intention” of targeting the United States was not adequate to find liability
under the FTAIA.201
The discussion of targeting went on to identify an instance in which the
court found the defendants conduct potentially warranted liability under the
FTAIA. Plaintiffs had brought forward evidence that the defendants had
produced certain types of SRAM products to be sold through a chain of
manufacturers with the specific purpose of having the SRAM product
incorporated into a final good sold in the United States.202 The court
acknowledged that if the plaintiffs provided more evidence of this specific
targeting by the defendants, subsequent domestic price inflation could meet the
requisite effect requirement under the Act.203
SRAM represents an interpretation of the FTAIA that could serve as a
useful model for the “objective businessperson” standard. The court looked at
the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the effect on the United
States and offered an answer as to whether such a connection would be
“reasonably foreseeable.”204 By focusing on this connection, courts can
consistently identify whether certain foreign behavior will have a “reasonably
foreseeable” effect under the FTAIA.
D. Applying the New Unified Standard: Minn-Chem
This Part has set forward three standards by which to measure the domestic
effects prong of the FTAIA: directness under a “proximate cause” standard,
substantiality under a standard focusing on the “price and volume” of the good,
and reasonable foreseeability based on an “objective businessperson” standard.
While the previous sections have provided models of how each standard would
operate individually,205 this section will evaluate all three standards
simultaneously. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc.,206 a recent decision from the
Seventh Circuit, provides a satisfactory model for this Comment’s proposed
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Id. at *7.
Id.
203 Id.
204 The court did not explicitly state that this discussion went to whether the conduct was “reasonably
foreseeable.” However, this type of discussion would be the type intended under the “objective
businessperson” standard.
205 See supra Part II.A.3, B.3, C.3.
206 683 F.3d 845, 848–51, 857–59 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
202

BIFULCO GALLEYSPROOFS2

904

2/19/2015 12:37 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:869

unified standard: in addition to providing detailed facts, the court performed an
analysis similar to the analysis advocated by this Comment.
Minn-Chem involved a complaint that a global cartel had formed to limit
the supply of the commodity potash, which is commonly used in fertilizers
among other goods. The defendants allegedly controlled 71% of the world’s
supply of potash.207 By allegedly limiting the supply of potash, the cartel
gained the ability to inflate prices.208 The complaint alleged that the cartel was
able to maintain and increase profits despite the declining potash demand.209
Turning to the FTAIA, the Seventh Circuit separated the complaint into
allegations involving entities that sold potash directly to U.S. consumers and
allegations involving entities that did not.210 The direct purchase of potash
constituted “import commerce,” which bypassed the FTAIA and went straight
into a Sherman Act analysis for antitrust violations.211 The foreign purchases,
however, did not involve import commerce and therefore had to be evaluated
under the FTAIA, including whether the conduct of inflating prices abroad had
a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” effect on the U.S.
economy.212
The Seventh Circuit engaged in a lengthy discussion of the meaning of
“direct” before evaluating the connection between defendant’s alleged
anticompetitive conduct and the alleged effect on U.S. commerce.213 The
complaint alleged that the cartel first limited the amount of potash available
internationally to disturb the market price of the commodity.214 With increased
demand for the limited supply, the cartel allegedly then set prices for potash
abroad and then used those prices as benchmarks for prices in the United
States.215 The foreign price increases “almost immediately” appeared in the
prices paid for U.S. imports.216 Therefore, the court found that the chain of
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Id. at 849.
The price of potash did not simultaneously increase for foreign purchasers and U.S. purchasers.
American prices did, however, rapidly respond to foreign price increases. Id. at 856.
209 The complaint carefully described how the decreasing demand for potash was not a result of the
inflated prices of the cartel. Id. at 849–50.
210 Id. at 858–59.
211 Id. at 855, 858–59.
212 Id. at 859.
213 Id. at 856–58.
214 Id. at 859.
215 Id.
216 Id.
208
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events217 established that the anticompetitive conduct proximately caused
effects in the United States—or in other words that there was a “direct”
effect.218
Moving to substantiality, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs stated
that the price of potash increased 600% during the alleged conspiracy.219 The
court also noted that 5.3 million tons of potash were imported into the United
States during the final year of the alleged conspiracy.220 The court found that
these figures “easily satisf[ied]” the substantial effects requirement.221 The
court noted that “wherever the [substantial effect] floor may be, it is so far
below these numbers that we do not worry about it here.”222
Finally, the Seventh Circuit discussed whether the price increase was a
reasonably foreseeable effect of the defendant’s conduct. The court performed
this analysis on a macro and micro level. On the macro level, the court noted
that it would be reasonably foreseeable that a price increase by a cartel with
71% of the world’s supply of a product would be felt uniformly throughout the
world.223 On the micro level, the court focused on the three potential responses
to a cartel price increase: cheating among cartel members, introducing a new
entrant, and increasing prices in all markets.224 Since any of these effects were
reasonably foreseeable to a cartel, the court concluded that the allegations of
the plaintiff satisfactorily demonstrated that the conduct of the cartel had a
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on the United States.225
The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Minn-Chem embodies a
model investigation of whether foreign behavior is sufficiently connected to
domestic effects under the FTAIA. Structurally, the court discussed “direct,”
“substantial,” and “reasonably foreseeable” in individual paragraphs.226 This
helped to define which aspects of the opinion apply to each operative phrase of
the statute. Substantively, each discussion focused on specific facts alleged and

217 Foreign supply of potash decreased, causing foreign potash prices to increase, which in turn caused
domestic potash prices to increase.
218 Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 859.
219 Id. at 856.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 859.
225 Id. at 860.
226 Id. at 856–57.
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elaborated on why those allegations sufficed for each element.227 The court
also attempted to set out the standard for two of the operative phrases. The
court provided a lengthy discussion justifying the use of proximate cause in
determining directness and then explained how the case at hand fulfilled its
definition.228 While the court did not specifically elaborate on what makes
conduct sufficiently substantial, its approach began to draw guidelines for
future courts to follow.229
This Comment’s only critique of the Seventh Circuit’s approach is a minor
one: at no point in the opinion does the court note the “reasonable person
making practical business judgments” language used by the drafters of the
FTAIA in formulating the legislative history to the Act.230 In this case, the
effects of the cartel’s actions would be reasonably foreseeable, if not obvious,
to most people, let alone objective businesspeople. However, there is good
reason to clarify that the objective businessperson under the FTAIA is one who
possesses more knowledge of the market than the reasonable person. This
simple step by the Seventh Circuit would prevent false negatives within the
reasonable foreseeability inquiry by promoting a broader standard for
plaintiffs: while a reasonable person may not know the details of the potash
industry, a person making reasonable business judgments in the industry
should be aware of the potential implications of cartel behavior. Beyond this
limited critique, the Minn-Chem opinion demonstrates an ideal model for
application of the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” test under
the FTAIA.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW, UNIFIED APPROACH
As the previous Part demonstrates, this Comment’s approach is grounded
in part in case law. Nevertheless, the approach is not yet employed consistently
or uniformly. Encouraging courts to use the correct standards at each element,
use them together, and apply them consistently when evaluating the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act will have myriad positive implications.
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Id. at 856–59.
Id.
229 Ideally, a court using the new standards will be able to give a more concise statement of the
substantiality boundary than “wherever the floor may be” as the standards are more commonly provided. See
id. at 856.
230 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2494.
228
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First, this Comment’s approach reduces conflicting interpretations of the
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” language of the FTAIA. As
demonstrated in the previous Parts, courts already take numerous approaches
in interpreting the prong: one court interpreted all phrases,231 some interpret a
few phrases,232 and others barely interpret the language at all.233 For those
courts that have attempted to interpret the statute, the language has taken on
various meanings, and courts will likely continue to create additional
standards. This confusion can be remedied by consistently applying the unified
framework advocated by this Comment, as demonstrated in Minn-Chem. In
some regards, the past treatment of the first FTAIA prong sets the stage for the
new approach: those courts that have largely ignored the “direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable” language of the FTAIA can now adopt this new
approach and reduce confusion as to the meaning of the statutory language.
Second, this Comment’s approach balances the concerns expressed in
Alcoa and by the members of Congress who passed the FTAIA. Using a
proximate cause standard for directness guarantees that only conduct that is
sufficiently linked to the United States will be pursued by private plaintiffs and
the government. Focusing on the substantiality of the effect in regard to price
and volume will allow the courts to weed out the “de minimis”234 effects that
may be caused due to the global economy. Requiring an objective
businessperson standard strikes the correct balance between holding
international entities responsible while not expecting every reasonable person
to understand the economic implications of international firm action or
expecting attorneys to find evidence of subjective intent of the firms to affect
the United States.
Third, the approach taken by this Comment allows the statute to function
according to its express terms and helps judges by creating a simpler
application of the statute. By allowing judges to clearly define when conduct
has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect,” the new, unified
standard proposed by this Comment makes it easier for courts to then discuss if
the effect “gives rise to” the plaintiff’s injury. By creating a framework that
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Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 856–57.
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 466–68 (3d Cir. 2011).
233 See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC 128 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 284 F.3d 384, 394–95 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming antitrust liability under the FTAIA); In re
Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ.00MDL1328(PAM), 2005 WL 1080790 at *4 (D. Minn.
May 2, 2005), aff’d, 447 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007).
234 H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2491.
232
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encourages courts that have otherwise ignored some or all of the effects
language in the FTAIA to more explicitly address each element in the first
prong, this Comment’s standard removes the possibility of results that are false
positives. That is, courts that have previously only concerned themselves with
whether the effect “gives rise to” the plaintiff’s injury miss the important step
of making sure the effect is “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable.”
The unified approach advocated by this Comment removes that concern: only
effects that are “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” under the
proposed standards will be evaluated under the latter prong of the FTAIA,
thereby removing the possibility of false positives.
Finally, the new, unified approach advocated by this Comment allows an
otherwise underutilized section of the FTAIA to provide courts with a better
platform to address other concerns within antitrust jurisprudence. This section
of the FTAIA can adequately address an issue that has troubled courts with
antitrust law: how the interactions of a complex economy actually affect U.S.
consumers. By requiring plaintiffs to plead facts to inform the court of the
actual connection between the conduct of the international entity and the effect
on U.S. commerce, the court can more confidently rule on the applicability of
the FTAIA and correctly dismiss a claim under the appropriate language of the
statute.
These implications highlight a considerable need within the FTAIA’s
jurisprudence and demonstrate how the proposed standards could begin the
process of clarifying the law and making the statute more effective. This
solution would certainly not be an overnight success. Echoing the sentiment of
the Seventh Circuit in Minn-Chem when it acknowledged that the “floor” of
substantiality had not yet been established,235 continued judicial application of
the new standard would be required to create a semblance of a bright-line rule
for each of the operative phrases. Nevertheless, the use of a consistent standard
by the courts in interpreting the “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable” effects requirement of the FTAIA will start the courts on a path
towards a clearer and more effective statute.
CONCLUSION
The recent increase in litigation for alleged antitrust violations by foreign
companies has drawn attention to the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
235

Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 856.
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Act, a deceivingly simple statute that has received limited judicial
development. As the decisions continue to emerge and the fines associated
with these antitrust violations continue to increase in both size and volume, the
underdevelopment of the FTAIA could seriously undermine the intent of the
statute. This is especially true in regard to the requirement that foreign conduct
have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on the United
States, a section of the FTAIA that has been ignored or interpreted in a wide
variety of ways by different courts.
This Comment proposes a new, unified standard for interpreting each
phrase contained within the effects requirement of the FTAIA. Under the
FTAIA, a plaintiff should only be allowed to allege an antitrust violation if the
foreign conduct fulfills three standards. First, the conduct is “direct” in that it
proximately causes the effect in the United States. Second, the conduct is
“substantial” in that the conduct affects the price and volume of the good in the
United States in a “substantial” way. Third, the conduct is “reasonably
foreseeable” in that an objective businessperson could foresee the
anticompetitive conduct affecting the United States.
By utilizing the standards advocated by this Comment, the courts would
unify under an interpretation that is based primarily in case law. Courts could
use this Comment’s standards to reduce the inefficiency created by the varying
definitions and provide meaning to an otherwise ignored statute. Giving each
section of the FTAIA meaning allows the statute to function as Congress
intended and allows a more natural reading that gives the FTAIA the ability to
comprehend new developments in the global economy.
This Comment only breaks the surface of potential areas of interest within
the FTAIA. This Comment does not explore how the new standard would
interact with the interpretations of later parts of the FTAIA, including the
“gives rise to” requirement and claims under the Sherman Act. Other areas of
research left unexplored by this Comment include the specific standard that
should be applied to determine whether an individual qualifies as an ordinary
businessperson in the field and what role “pass-on” liability should play in
FTAIA determinations.236 Finally, as the global market becomes more
integrated, two divergent trends emerge. Enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws
against foreign companies becomes easier given the higher likelihood of the
foreign antitrust violations impacting domestic commerce based on reduced
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See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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transaction costs and the greater interconnectivity of national markets.
However, as markets become more complex, it becomes more difficult to
anticipate the exact chain of events that gets a finished product into the United
States. As these trends diverge, the workability of all standards within the
FTAIA should continue to be evaluated.
These unexplored questions will hopefully be answered in later scholarship.
Until then, this Comment takes an underutilized section of a statute of growing
importance, gives that section a new, unified meaning, and hopes that the
standards proposed spark a renewed interest in the “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” requirement of the FTAIA.
GERARD F. BIFULCO∗

∗ Emory University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2015; Executive Symposium Editor, Emory Law
Journal; B.A. Political Science and Economics, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would first
like to thank Professor Sasha Volokh for his thoughtful comments and guidance. I would also like to thank
Ben Klebanoff, Matt Hayes, and the other editors of the Emory Law Journal for their edits and suggestions. I’d
also like to thank those friends who have helped me throughout my many years of school: I would not be
where I am today without your constant encouragement and companionship. Finally, I’d like to thank my
family for their love and understanding throughout my life. Law school is only the most recent chapter in this
fascinating adventure of my life, and with the support of these people I cannot wait to see what’s next.

